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An Analysis of Economic Cost Minimization and Biological
Invasion Damage Control Using the AWQ Criterion1
by
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2An Analysis of Economic Cost Minimization and Biological
Invasion Damage Control Using the AWQ Criterion
Abstract
DeAngelo et al. (2006) have recently used the  criterion in a  queuing model toAWS M/G/1
show that there is no necessary tension between economic cost minimization and inspection
stringency in non-native species management. In this paper, we use an alternate cost criterion ( AWQ
criterion) to investigate the generality of this central result in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Our theoretical
analysis shows that there is no unambiguous answer to this question. Therefore, we use numerical
methods and our numerical analysis leads to two findings. First, for many values of the model
parameters that describe the strictness of inspections, there is a tension between cost minimization
and inspection stringency. Second, for most values of the model parameter that depicts the volume
of maritime trade handled by the seaport under consideration, there is no tension between cost
minimization and inspection stringency.
Keywords: AWQ Criterion, Inspection, Invasive Species, Maritime Trade, Queuing Theory
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31. Introduction
In modern times, airplanes, ships, and trucks have all been used to carry goods from one
region of the world to another. Representative textbooks in international trade such as Feenstra
(2004) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2005) tell us that unrestricted trade between different regions of
the world is welfare improving. This notwithstanding, researchers in both the life and the social
sciences have increasingly pointed out that the extent of these welfare improvements is likely to be
less than what most investigators have hitherto posited. Why? As Parker et al. (1999), Batabyal
(2004), and Work et al. (2005) have noted, this is because in addition to carrying goods between
regions, airplanes, ships, and trucks have also managed to carry a whole host of non-native plant and
animal species (also known as alien or invasive species) from one geographical region of the world
to another. 
There are many ways in which airplanes, ships, and trucks have transported non-native plant
and animal species from one region of the world to another. Non-native animal species have
sometimes succeeded in lodging themselves in the landing gear of airplanes and in this way they have
traveled as stowaways from one nation to another. Similarly, a number of marine non-native species
have been introduced unintentionally into a region by ships dumping their ballast water. Cargo ships
commonly carry ballast water in order to augment vessel stability when they are not carrying full
loads. When these ships come into a seaport, this ballast water must be released before cargo can be
loaded. This means of species introductions is important and very recently the problem of managing
alien species that have been introduced into a particular region by means of the dumping of ballast
5See Yang and Perakis (2004), Batabyal et al. (2005), and Batabyal and Beladi (2006) for more on this literature.
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water has received some attention in the literature.5 
Ships routinely use containers to carry cargo from one nation to another and these containers
are often the source for the introduction of one or more non-native species. Such introductions take
place because non-native species can remain hidden in containers for long periods of time. In addition,
substances such as wood—often used to pack cargo in containers—may themselves contain non-
native species. In fact, as noted by Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005), a joint report from the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and
the United States Forest Service (USFS) has shown that nearly 51.8% of maritime shipments contain
solid wood packing substances and that infection rates for solid wood packing substances are non-
trivial (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, p. 25)). To see this, consider the following case.
Inspections of wooden spools from China revealed infection rates between 22% and 24% and
inspections of braces for granite blocks imported into Canada were found to hold live insects 32%
of the time (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, pp. 27-28)). 
When non-native species invade new habitats, they give rise to immense costs in the nations
in which these novel habitats are located. Here are two illustrations of such costs from the United
States. First, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA (1993)) has established that the Russian
wheat aphid caused $600 million worth of crop damage between 1987 and 1989. Second, Pimentel
et al. (2000) have calculated the total costs of all non-native species at around $137 billion per year.
Economic costs are not the end of the story. In fact, in addition to these economic costs, non-native
species have caused a lot of ecological damage as well. For example, Vitousek et al. (1996) have
5noted that non-native species can change ecosystem processes, act as vectors of diseases, and
diminish biological diversity. In addition, Cox (1993) has observed that out of 256 vertebrate
extinctions with a known cause, 109 are the outcome of the actions of non-native species. Because
of these reasons, both economists and ecologists are very interested in the management of non-native
species. 
Now, from the standpoint of a manager, there are a number of actions that this individual can
take to address the problem of biological invasions. These actions are typically pre-invasion or post-
invasion in nature. The objective of pre-invasion actions is to prevent non-native species from
invading a new habitat. In contrast, post-invasion actions involve the optimal control of a non-native
species, given that this species has already invaded a new habitat. The nascent economics literature
on the management of non-native species has generally focused its attention on the properties of
alternate post-invasion actions. For instance, Barbier (2001) has noted that the economic impact of
a biological invasion can be discerned by analyzing the nature of the interaction between the native
and the alien species. Using an intertemporal management model Eiswerth and Johnson (2002) point
out that the optimal level of management effort is responsive to ecological factors that are not only
species and site specific but also probabilistic in nature. Olson and Roy (2002) have used a stochastic
framework to examine the situations in which it is optimal to wipe out a non-native species and the
situations in which it is not optimal to do so. Finally, Eiswerth and van Kooten (2002) have shown
that in some cases, it is possible to use information furnished by specialists to create a model in which
it is optimal to not eradicate but instead regulate the spread of an alien species.
Inspections are a basic pre-invasion tool that is available to managers interested in precluding
biological invasions. They are routinely used at airports, land border crossings, and in seaports to
6screen humans, the cargo carried by humans, and the cargo carried in containers. As a result, several
researchers have now begun to formally study inspections and their properties in the context of non-
native species management. In this regard, McAusland and Costello (2004), Batabyal et al. (2005),
Batabyal and Beladi (2006), and DeAngelo et al. (2006) have all studied the properties of alternate
ways of structuring the inspection function given that inspections are a very useful practical pre-
invasion management tool. McAusland and Costello (2004) show that when one takes a dynamic
view and considers the future effects of current species introductions, one is naturally led to favor
more stringent inspections. Batabyal and Beladi (2006) use queuing theory to show how
maximization problems for choosing the optimal number of inspectors can be formulated after one
undertakes a stationary state analysis of two multi-person inspection regimes. Batabyal et al. (2005)
have analyzed  and  queuing models of inspections and have concluded that there isM/M/1 M/M/2
a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species
management. What this means is that greater inspection stringency with a larger number of inspectors
leads to higher economic costs and laxer inspection stringency with a smaller number of inspectors
results in lower economic costs. 
The paper that is most closely related to our paper is the one by DeAngelo et al. (2006).
Focusing their attention on an arbitrary seaport, these researchers have studied the properties of
inspections by utilizing the “average wait of a ship in the port system” or  criterion in a AWS M/G/1
queuing model. Their basic result is that there is no necessary tension between economic cost
minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species management. In the context of their
paper, greater (lesser) inspection stringency reflects an enhanced (decreased) concern for the potential
damage from a biological invasion. Therefore, a seaport manager who places a relatively big (small)
6For more on this point see Ross (2003, p. 477).
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weight on invasion damage control will, all else being equal, want to inspect ships more (less)
stringently.
As we have noted previously, inspections clearly constitute an important part of the general
task of pre-invasion non-native species management. Therefore, we use an alternate cost criterion,
namely the “average wait of a ship in queue” or  criterion to investigate the generality of theAWQ
central “no necessary tension” result in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Note that we’re not saying that AWS
is a useless measure of costs. On the contrary, it is a perfectly reasonable way to model the economic
cost of inspections. Further, we stress that within the context of a queuing model of non-native
species management, there are two standard ways of modeling the economic cost imposed on society
by inspections.6 DeAngelo et al. (2006) have used  and have hence concentrated on the first ofAWS
these two ways. Therefore, a natural question to ask is whether the central DeAngelo et al. (2006)
result holds when costs are modeled using the second of these two ways. That is what we’re doing
in this paper by focusing on  and this is the sense in which our paper is an extension of theAWQ
earlier DeAngelo et al. (2006) paper. 
Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that there is an ambiguous answer to this tension
question. Hence, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions.
First, for many values of the model parameters that describe the strictness of inspections, there is a
tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Second, for most values of the model
parameter that depicts the volume of maritime trade handled by the seaport under consideration, there
is no tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Our results in this paper are
7For additional details on this property see Ross (2003, pp. 272-273).
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different from the findings in Batabyal et al. (2005) with the  and the  queuing models.M/M/1 M/M/2
The general reason for this variance is that the queuing model that we employ in this paper is different
from the queuing models used by Batabyal et al. (2005). More specifically, the random inspection
times in the Batabyal et al. (2005) paper are exponentially distributed and the exponential distribution
is the unique distribution that has the so called memoryless property.7 In contrast, in the present
paper, the inspection times are generally and not exponentially distributed.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a primer on queuing theory
and then this section describes the queuing theoretic model that we use in this paper. Section 3 first
delineates the “average wait of a ship in queue” or  criterion that we use in this paper to exploreAWQ
the generality of the findings obtained by DeAngelo et al. (2006). Next, this third section conducts a
detailed theoretical and numerical analysis of the aforementioned tension question. Section 4 concludes
and offers suggestions for future research on the subject of this paper.
2. Economic Cost Minimization and Inspection Stringency
2.1. Queuing theory: a primer
Queuing theory—see Taylor and Karlin (1998) and Ross (2003) for textbook
expositions—studies waiting lines or queues from a mathematical perspective. All queuing models
have the following three features. First, there is a random arrival process. Second, there is a
probabilistic service process. Finally, there is a deterministic number of servers. In the queuing model
of this paper, the Poisson process constitutes the arrival process. In this case, the times between
successive arrivals are exponentially distributed and the exponential distribution is memoryless.
8We use the Poisson process in part because this process has been used extensively in the literature on natural resources and the
environment to model arrivals. For a more detailed corroboration of this claim, see Uhler and Bradley (1970), Arrow and Chang
(1980), Mangel (1985), and Batabyal (2003).
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Note that when we say that the random inspection time is arbitrarily distributed, this does not mean that there are absolutely no
restrictions imposed on this random variable. In fact, we are restricting the support of this random variable to be the non-negative
real line. A second restriction is that we need the inspection time random variable’s first two moments (mean and variance) to be
finite. Beyond these two basic restrictions, we intend our analysis in this paper to be as general as possible. That is why, in what
follows, we begin with the theoretical analysis and then proceed to the numerical analysis when it is clear that the theoretical
analysis will not provide unambiguous results. Finally, it is quite possible that the idiosyncracies of inspections in specific practical
situations will impose further restrictions on the level of inspection stringency that a seaport manager will want to have in place.
We suppose that these restrictions are captured in different values of the first two moments of the inspection time random variable.
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Therefore, the letter  is commonly used to describe the Poisson arrival process.8M
Like the interarrival times of the previous paragraph, in general, the service or inspection times
are also stochastic. The reader will recall that the main aim of our paper is to investigate the generality
of the findings in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Therefore, like DeAngelo et al. (2006), we also use the
letter  to denote the general cumulative distribution function of the random inspection times.9G
Finally, the deterministic number of inspectors is generally denoted by some positive integer and in our
paper we suppose that this positive integer is one. In the language of queuing theory, the inspection
regime that we’re analyzing in this paper corresponds to the  queuing model. In words, in ourM/G/1
model, the arrival process of ships in the seaport is Poisson, the time it takes to inspect a ship is
arbitrarily or generally distributed, and there is one representative inspector. 
2.2. Inspections in alien species management
Consider a stylized seaport in a specific coastal region of some nation that is publically owned.
Ships with ballast water and/or cargo in containers arrive at this seaport to either load or unload cargo.
If they have arrived to load cargo then these ships carry this cargo to a seaport in some other region
of the world. The arrival of these ships coincides with the arrival of a whole host of possibly damaging
non-native animal and plant species. We suppose that the arrival rate of these animal and plant species
10
is proportional to the arrival rate of the ships and hence we shall not model these species directly.
Instead, we shall concentrate on the ships that bring these species to our seaport by means of either
their ballast water or the containers that are used to carry the cargo. The arrival process of the ships
in our seaport denotes the arrival process for the queuing theoretic inspection regimes that we analyze
in this paper. 
Following the discussion in section 2.1, we assume that the ships in question arrive at our
seaport in conformity with a Poisson process with rate  The reader should note that, ceterisλ>0.
paribus, a higher  indicates two things. First, because the arrival rate of the various non-native animalλ
and plant species is proportional to the arrival rate of the ships, a higher  means a larger volume ofλ
possibly deleterious biological organisms and hence a higher chance of a biological invasion. Second,
a higher  also means that our seaport is now dealing with more cargo or a higher volume of maritimeλ
trade. This discussion tells us that  serves as a proxy for both the likelihood of a biological invasionλ
and the volume of maritime trade.
A key objective of our seaport manager is to prevent invasions by the potentially destructive
animal and plant species entering the seaport under study. Hence, arriving ships must be inspected
before they can either load or unload cargo. We suppose that ships are inspected on a first-come-first-
served basis and one inspector is assigned to each dock in our seaport. In what follows, we shall
analyze a representative dock inspector’s decision problem. Also, we shall think of the inspection
function broadly. What this means is that for some ships, only the ballast water will be inspected. For
other ships, only the containers carrying cargo will require inspection. Finally, for a third group of
ships, both the ballast water and the containers will be inspected. Therefore, inspections will generally
require random amounts of time. To model this explicitly, we allow the inspection times to be
10
There is support in the extant literature for our “lower (higher) variance implies more (less) reliable” interpretation. For additional
details on this point see Salvucci et al. (1997) and Yu (2005).
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arbitrarily distributed. The seaport system under study consists of ships that are being inspected, ships
that are waiting to be inspected, the representative dock inspector, and the seaport manager.
It is reasonable to expect that the amount of time it takes to complete inspections has a direct
bearing on the stringency of inspections. Hence, to model this idea, we assume that there are two
feasible inspection regimes in our seaport. In the first or more stringent inspection regime, the average
inspection time is  and the variance of this time is  In the second or less stringent inspectionνM τ
2
M.
regime, the mean inspection time is  and the variance of this time is  Further, we assume thatνL τ
2
L.
 and that  These two inequalities together tell us that inspection regime  is moreνM>νL τ
2
M<τ
2
L. M
stringent than inspection regime  Why? Because relative to regime  on average, regime L. L, M
requires that more time be spent on the inspection function. Also, the variability of the time spent
inspecting ships in regime  is less than the variability of the time spent inspecting ships in regime M L.
As a consequence, the more stringent  regime’s inspection times have a smaller coefficient ofM
variation and thus are consistently smaller compared to those of the less stringent  regime. L
The reader should note that we are measuring the reliability of the two inspection regimes with
the two variance parameters  and  In other words, the stringent regime is stringent not onlyτ2M τ
2
L.
because on average the inspector spends more time inspecting ships but also because, having spent
more time, the inspector can be more certain that he has not made either type I or type II errors while
discharging his duties. This feeling “more certain” corresponds to greater reliability and this greater
reliability, in turn, corresponds to a lower variance. That is why we have 10 Given thisτ2M<τ
2
L.
interpretation, note that the  case is intuitively and practically implausible because this caseτ2M>τ
2
L
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would mean that even though the inspector spends more time on average in the stringent regime
inspecting ships, he is still less certain about the reliability of the inspection that he has undertaken.
The basic description of our two queuing theoretic inspection regimes is now complete. The
more stringent inspection regime  corresponds to a  queuing model with average inspectionM M/G/1
time  and variance  and the less stringent or  inspection regime also corresponds to a νM τ
2
M L M/G/1
queuing model but now with mean inspection time  and variance  The reader should understandνL τ
2
L.
the manner in which we have mathematically depicted the basic question of this paper: When seeking
to preclude a biological invasion by inspecting the ballast water and/or the containers of ships, which
inspection regime,  or  ought our seaport manager to have in place? We now proceed toM L,
theoretically and numerically analyze the inspection regime choice question for the  cost criterionAWQ
that we identified in section 1.
3. The AWQ criterion
Inspections that lead to the preclusion of a biological invasion by non-native animal or plant
species undoubtedly result in benefits to the citizens of the coastal region that we are studying.
However, during the time that arriving ships are being inspected, there is neither loading nor unloading
of cargo, and hence, in general, economic activity resulting from maritime trade is at a standstill. This
ephemeral stoppage of economic activities imposes costs on the economy of our coastal region. This
cost can be measured by computing a specific criterion such as “the average wait of a ship in the port
system” or  In this way of looking at the problem, the longer (shorter) the average wait in theAWS.
port system or  the larger (smaller) the costs from the cessation of economic activities.AWS,
Therefore, a seaport manager who is concerned primarily about the economic costs that are imposed
on society by the activities of the representative inspector will want to keep  as low as possible.AWS
13
In contrast, a seaport manager who frets more about the possible damage to society from a biological
invasion will want to have the more stringent or  inspection regime in place. DeAngelo et al. (2006)M
have used this  criterion in a  queuing model and have shown that contrary to the centralAWS M/G/1
finding in Batabyal et al. (2005), there is no universal tension between economic cost minimization
and inspection stringency in non-native species management.
As noted in section 1, the  criterion is one of two possible criteria that we can use inAWS
thinking about the above mentioned economic costs in the context of a queuing model. As such,
suppose we adopt a somewhat looser interpretation of these costs and say that the loading and/or the
unloading of cargo may proceed on a ship that is presently being inspected for potentially invasive
species but that such activities may not take place on ships that have yet to be inspected and are
waiting in queue. In this way of looking at the problem, ships in queue are the ones that are most likely
to impose economic costs on society. We shall refer to this second—and somewhat looser—economic
cost criterion as the “average wait of a ship in queue” or  criterion. Given this alternate costAWQ
criterion, a key issue that arises is this: Do the findings contained in DeAngelo et al. (2006) hold when
the  criterion and not the  criterion is used to measure the economic cost of inspections?AWQ AWS
We now address this question in detail.
Our first order of business is to compute  for the two  inspection regimes that weAWQ M/G/1
are presently studying. To do this, we shall use equations 1.2 and 3.17 in Taylor and Karlin (1998, p.
544 and p. 563). Using these two equations, our desired expressions for  areAWQ
 and (1)AWQM'{λ(τ2M%ν2M)}/{2(1&λνM)} AWQL'{λ(τ2L%ν2L)}/{2(1&λνL)}
respectively for the two regimes. We can use the inequalities  and  to show thatνM>νL τ
2
M<τ
2
L
 However, because  may be larger or smaller than  simply2(1&λvM)<2(1&λνL). (τ2M%ν2M) (τ2L%ν2L),
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knowing that  and that  does not permit us to say anything unambiguous about the relativeνM>νL τ
2
M<τ
2
L
magnitudes of  and  In other words, when our seaport manager sanctions the use of theAWQM AWQL.
more stringent  inspection regime in the seaport under study, it is not always the case that economicM
costs measured by the  criterion will be higher. So, in the general case, there may or may not beAWQ
a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency. This tells us that even when
we use the  criterion, the finding in DeAngelo et al. (2006) that there is no necessary tensionAWQ
between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency holds. 
We have just seen that there is no unique resolution of this tension question. To provide
additional insight into this issue, in the remainder of this paper, we use a numerical perspective to
study this tension question in three different ways. However, before we move to the specifics of the
numerical analysis, let us stress three points. First, it is clearly infeasible to work with the infinitely
many combinations of the model parameters  that are possible. As such, the reader(λ,νM,νL,τ2M,τ2L)
should understand that the primary point of the subsequent numerical analysis is illustrative. We wish
to demonstrate not only the functional dependence of the  criterion on the various modelAWQ
parameters but also the different results that obtain as we vary these parameters. Second, we have
conducted numerical analyses of the sort delineated below with many different values of the distinct
model parameters. Rather than bore the reader with umpteen graphs of the various possible results,
what we are reporting below is a selection of model parameters that generates—to the best of our
knowledge—representative results. Finally, the collective lesson from the above two points is that the
answer to the central tension question that we are investigating in this paper is seaport specific.
Different seaports are likely to have different values of the arrival rate  Therefore, in a particularλ.
practical situation, a seaport manager will typically want to choose the inspection regime stringency
11
Clearly,  is not the only possible objective function for a seaport manager. Depending on the specifics of a particular situation,AWQ
a seaport manager may want to minimize costs in addition to those that we are capturing in  AWQ.
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parameters  to account for the specific value of  confronting him as he optimizes a particular(ν,τ) λ
objective function such as 11AWQ.
Let the arrival rate of ships be  per unit time. Further, suppose that the parameters of theλ'1
two inspection regimes are  and Now, employing equation (1), it(νM,τ2M)'(0.5,0.2) (νL,τ2L)'(0.4,0.9).
is straightforward to confirm that  and  When  theseAWQM'0.45λ/(2&λ) AWQL'1.06λ/(2&0.8λ). λ'1,
two expressions reduce to  and AWQM'0.45 AWQL'0.88.
Examining these two expressions for  we see that as the arrival rate of ships AWQM (AWQL) λ
approaches 2 (2.5), economic costs measured by the  criterion approach infinity. ThisAWQM (AWQL)
means that there is an upper limit on the volume of maritime trade that our seaport can handle and
when this limit is approached, the economic costs of inspections become immeasurably large. Second,
when  and  are as stated in the previous paragraph, the economic costs of inspections areνM,νL,τ
2
M, τ
2
L
lower when the more stringent  inspection regime is in place. The reader will note that this is alsoM
a case in which there is no tension between economic cost reduction and inspection stringency.
3.1. The tension question in terms of the volume of maritime trade
For the parameter values specified above, we now analyze the dependence of  on AWQ λ.
Equating  and  and then simplifying gives usAWQM'0.45λ/(2&λ)'0.45 AWQL'1.06λ/(2&0.8λ)'0.88
(2)0.70λ2&1.22λ'0.
The two solutions to equation (2) are  and  Because  must be positive, we concludeλ(1'1.74 λ(2'0. λ
that  is the only economically meaningful solution in this case. Figure 1 plots  on theλ'1.74 AWQ
Figure 1 about here
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vertical axis against the arrival rate of ships  on the horizontal axis. Looking at figure 1 we see thatλ
for all values of  our seaport manager will prefer to have the more stringent or λ, 0<λ#1.74, M
inspection regime in place because this regime leads to lower economic costs as measured by the
 criterion. Only when  does it make sense for the seaport manager to use the lessAWQ λ>1.74
stringent or  inspection regime to inspect arriving ships at the seaport under study. Put differently,L
when  there is no tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasionλ0(0,1.74]
damage control. In contrast, there is a tension between economic cost minimization and the stringency
of inspections when λ>1.74.
3.2. The tension question in terms of the mean inspection times
We now numerically investigate the functional dependence of  on the means  ofAWQ (νM,νL)
the two inspection regimes and in section 3.3 we shall conduct a similar exercise from the standpoint
of the two variances  As in our earlier numerical analysis, we have  and  Further,(τ2M,τ2L). νM>νL τ2M<τ2L.
in order to conduct the subsequent numerical analysis in two dimensions, we suppose that
 and that  In other words, the two means and the two variances areνM'aνL, a>1 τ
2
M'bτ
2
L, b0(0,1).
assumed to be linearly related to each other and the parameters  and  are the two constants ofa b
proportionality. From an economic standpoint, we can think of the parameter  as a measure of thea
difference in the stringencies of the two inspection regimes  and  Similarly, the parameter  canM L. b
be thought of as a measure of the difference in the variability—and hence the reliability—of the same
two inspection regimes. 
Now, using the section 3 parameter values, we have  andλ'1,νM'aνL,νL'0.4,τ
2
M'bτ
2
L,τ
2
L'0.9
we set  equal to its midpoint, i.e.,  Note that this  stipulation means that the moreb b'0.5. b'0.5
stringent inspection regime  is twice as reliable as the less stringent regime  Using these valuesM L.
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of the different parameters in equation (1), we get  andAWQM'(0.45%0.16a 2)/(2&0.8a)
 Setting these two values equal gives us the following quadratic equation in  AWQL'0.8833. a
(3)0.16a 2%0.71a&1.32'0.
The two solutions to equation (3) are  and  Because we must have  it followsa (1 '1.41 a (2 '&5.83. a>1
that the only economically meaningful solution to equation (3) is  a (1 '1.41.
Figure 2 plots the economic cost criterion  on the vertical axis against alternate valuesAWQ
Figure 2 about here
of  on the horizontal axis. Looking at figure 2 we see that when  our seaport manager isa a'1.41
indifferent between the two inspection regimes. Further, for all  the use of the more stringent a<1.41 M
inspection regime results in lower economic costs as measured by the  criterion. Finally, for all AWQ a>1.41
the use of the less stringent  inspection regime leads to lower economic costs. This tells us that whenL
 there is a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damagea>1.41
control. In contrast, when  lies in the interval  there is no tension between economic costa (1,1.41]
minimization and biological invasion damage control. Note that this last “no tension” result may appear
counterintuitive but it holds for some and not all values of  In addition, this last result does dependa.
on our assumption that  but as we have already pointed out in section 2.2, the alternateτ2M<τ
2
L
assumption that  is both intuitively and practically improbable.τ2M>τ
2
L
3.3. The tension question in terms of the variances of the inspection times
Our final task is to numerically examine the functional dependence of  on the variances AWQ (τ2M,τ2L)
of the  and the  inspection regimes. As in section 3.2, in order to conduct the analysis in twoM L
dimensions, we have  and  Further, using the previousτ2M<τ
2
L, νM>νL, τ
2
M'bτ
2
L, b0(0,1), νM'aνL, a>1.
values of the pertinent parameters, we have  and we shall set  The readerλ'1,νL'0.4,τ
2
L'0.9, a'2.
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should note that setting  means that relative to the less stringent inspection regime  on average,a'2 L,
twice as much time is spent in the more stringent regime  Substituting these values of the variousM.
parameters in equation (1), we get  and  Inspection of these twoAWQM'1.6%2.25b AWQL'0.8833.
expressions for the economic cost criterion and some reflection tell us that there is no value of  forb
which our seaport manager is indifferent between the two inspection regimes being studied. 
Figure 3 plots the economic cost criterion  on the vertical axis against alternate valuesAWQ
Figure 3 about here
of  on the horizontal axis. Figure 3 tells us that  is always lower when the less stringent b AWQ L
regime is used to inspect arriving ships in our seaport. In other words, for all values of  whichb
measures the difference in the variability—and hence reliability—of the two inspection regimes, there
is a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency or biological invasion
damage control. 
Does the above result depend on the specific value of  that we have chosen to conduct thea
numerical analysis with? The answer is yes and to see this consider what would happen if instead of
setting  we set  In this case, once again substituting the values of the various parametersa'2, a'1.2.
in equation (1), we get  and  Now settingAWQM'0.2215%0.8654b AWQL'0.8833.
 we get  This tells us that when we set AWQM'0.2215%0.8654b'0.8833'AWQL b'0.7647. a'1.2,
there is no tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control as
long as  In contrast, when  there is a tension between these twob0(0,0.7647]. b0(0.7647,1),
objectives. In terms of figure 3, what is happening is that as we reduce the value of  from  to a a'2 a'1.2,
the slope of the graph of  declines from 2.25 to 0.8654 and the graph itself gets pulled downAWQM
vertically toward the horizontal graph of  The reader should note that this finding—that theAWQL.
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result obtained in the previous two paragraphs depends on the specific value of —is consistent witha
the general illustration and demonstration of seaport specificity objectives of our numerical analysis
as stated in section 3. 
Our analysis thus far leads to four conclusions. First, the theoretical analysis tells us that the
question as to whether there is or isn’t a tension between economic cost minimization and biological
invasion damage control cannot be resolved unambiguously. Second, for many possible values of the a
parameter and for all possible values of the  parameter when  there is a tension betweenb a'2,
economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control. Third and at variance with the
second conclusion, for several values of  or the volume of maritime trade parameter, there is noλ
tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency. Finally, by varying both  and a b,
we have graphically shown the impact that alternate choices of these two parameters have on the
 objective function. In addition, this variation exercise also shows that for these two parameters,AWQ
inspection stringency, defined in terms of the mean and the variance of the inspection time random
variable, lies in the interval  and  These four conclusions are consistent with the maina0(1,4) b0(0,1).
findings obtained by DeAngelo et al. (2006) with the  cost criterion and hence we note that theAWS
basic findings of DeAngelo et al. (2006) are general in the sense that they hold not only for the AWS
cost criterion but also for the  cost criterion.AWQ
For real world applications of the model of this paper, we would need to procure values for
the arrival rate of ships and the averages and the variances of particular inspection regimes. In the
United States, information about the arrival rate of ships can be procured from the administrative
offices of individual seaports such as Long Beach and, on occasion, from governmental agencies such
as the Office of Mobile Sources of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Similarly, information
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about actual inspections in the United States can be procured from documents that are periodically
produced by the Congressional Research Service and from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS).
4. Conclusions
Non-native animal and plant species often succeed in invading new habitats as a result of
maritime trade in goods by means of ships. Hence, if an appropriate authority such as a seaport
manager’s goal is to prevent biological invasions, then he must inspect arriving ships for potentially
deleterious biological organisms. Given this context, we used the  cost criterion in the AWQ M/G/1
queuing model to investigate the generality of the findings obtained recently by DeAngelo et al.
(2006). Our theoretical analysis showed that there is no unique answer to the question as to whether
there is or isn’t a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control.
In addition, our numerical analysis identified particular values of the essential model parameters for
which there is a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control.
The general outcome of our combined theoretical and numerical analysis is twofold. First, the main
findings of DeAngelo et al. (2006) are general in the sense that they hold for the  and for theAWS
 cost criteria. Second, whether or not there is tension between economic cost minimization andAWQ
biological invasion damage control depends greatly on the organizational details—the arrival rate of
ships and the degree of stringency of inspections—in individual seaports. 
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. We now suggest one such
direction. One issue of interest concerns the analysis of situations in which because of heavy traffic in
a particular seaport, ships do not enter this seaport but go instead to some other seaport. From the
perspective of the manager of a single seaport, this heavy traffic situation can be analyzed with a
21
queuing model in which “balking” is permitted. In other words, if an arriving ship finds  other shipsn
already in our seaport then this ship enters our seaport only with some probability  and it goes top
n
some other seaport with probability  If we assume that long queues discourage ships from1&p
n
.
entering a seaport then we would expect  to be a decreasing function of  A special case of thisp
n
n.
balking scenario is one in which a seaport has a finite capacity  so that  for  and  for F p
n
'1 n<F p
n
'0 n$F.
As in this paper, one can analyze the properties of alternate inspection regimes in a model with these
heavy traffic related features.
From the perspective of a social welfare maximizing manager, who is responsible for all
seaports in a nation, a queuing analysis of the issues studied in this paper would have to determine the
desirable inspection stringency level at a particular seaport and coordinate inspection strategies in all
the seaports in this nation. This way, differential inspection standards would not exist and if they did
exist they would not, in and of themselves, provide incentives for arriving ships to favor certain
seaports over others. If this coordination aspect of the problem is not addressed then, in any particular
nation, the risk of one or more biological invasions may actually increase despite the presence of
inspections in all national seaports. Research on maritime trade driven biological invasions that
incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide additional insights into a
management problem that has considerable economic and ecological ramifications.
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